Consciousness, Literature and the Arts

Archive

Volume 3 Number 1, April 2002

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Graham, Gordon.  Philosophy of The Arts, Second Edition.  London:  Routledge, 2000.  224pp., ISBN:  0-415-23563-4 (Hbk), 0-415-23564-2 (Pbk).  £45 (Hbk),  £13.99 (Pbk)

Reviewed by

Anthony J. Palmer

 

Examining this new edition of Gordon Graham’s work prompts me to respond from two different perspectives.  The first is as an educator and the second is as a composer and conductor.  While these should be compatible at some deeper levels, there are some differences of opinion that emanate from these two different perspectives.

            First, as an educator, this introduction to philosophical aesthetics is an outstanding book.  Not only are we introduced to the various aesthetic positions—certainly a representation of Western historical thought on the subject, but also Graham succeeds with cogent critiques, making it much easier for the reader to see the various problems with the differing views.  In establishing the philosophical ground, excellent chapters discuss fundamental ideas and views toward art.  Chapters 1, 2, and 3 are successively titled Art and Pleasure, Art and Emotion, and Art and Understanding.  Chapter 4 focuses on Music and Meaning, while subsequent chapters discuss film, poetry, and architecture.  His final chapters include a discussion of the aesthetics of nature and theories of art.  Consequently, there is a broad representation of the arts so that students in any of the artistic fields would benefit from a complete reading, allowing them to compare the various forms and how each intersects with the other from an aesthetic viewpoint.  I would not hesitate to use this book as a primary text on Western aesthetic philosophizing.

            Graham also presents, appropriately, his idea of a philosophy of art.  The normative approach he suggests has certain merits.  Philosophers frequently establish a definition of art, then omit works that do not fit their preferred definition.  He asserts that what this actually does

is to convert a descriptive definition of art into a prescriptive or normative one, and there is no reason not to try expressly to formulate a normative conception of art.  The difference is that the aim of a normative one is to sort out from among the things known as art those that truly deserve the label (Italics in the original, 180).

 

Unlike many cultures in the African and Asian worlds, the Western world has a propensity to separate, classify, and categorize the objects of our experience, whether it be products of nature or of human origin.  Certainly this approach commends itself when we examine the great discoveries in the sciences and related fields, leading to appropriate taxonomies.  It does, however, when applied to the arts, fragment the field, both fine and practical.  While this lends itself to a commercial world, it does little to recognize that the crafts may contain much more artistic merit than those that are meant to be an arts-for-arts sake object.

Does a normative approach solve this problem?  We might assume that any approach should have a basic set of criteria by which to judge.  While not offering specifics, Graham does frame the question and value of the normative theory (199-203), relying on Hegel, Schopenhauer, and finally Collingwood, to set forth the primary quality of the normative approach.  He states that both “Collingwood and Schopenhauer both believe that the chief task of aesthetics is to explain the value and importance of art (Italics in the original, 203).  I see this as a worthwhile direction even as I continue with a view that appears to contradict the foregoing.

            As a composer and conductor, I would have to take issue with a philosophy of the arts on several grounds.  First and foremost in my mind is that philosophical aesthetics may be extremely limited in its view of artistic activity because many philosophers are not creative artists—painters, composers, choreographers, etc.  Thus, without experience in the creation of an artwork, limited understanding may affect their views of why artists do what they do.  Kant is a prime example of one who has had little aesthetic experience, in fact, one might say that he was immune to aesthetic experience.  Yet, Kant is highly influential in the philosophical ideas of many who followed, particularly with the idea of disinterestedness.  There is a problem with philosophers attempting to find some qualities in artistic works that apply across the spectrum of its many manifestations.  Philosophy attempts to find universals.  Art focuses on particulars.  Its particularity is the essence of any art form and while there may be a set of rules in general terms, as there is with, for example, the sonata-allegro form, its expression is unique and totally to be valued on its own merits.  More frequently than not, the rules are broken to the extent that one can say no rules exist except as an abstract notion.  To state that the normative position suggests that a macro view of the sonata-allegro form is its overriding ABA design is insufficient to separate what might be considered a great symphony from one of lesser quality.  Here is where I think the normative approach, at least as I understand it, is faulty.  There must be some deeper underlying consciousness that allows us to state that symphony A is better than symphony B.  As yet, we have not found those concepts and won’t, in my view, through the normative approach.

            A second area that causes me concern is that philosophy as a field is limited in the sense that it is not sufficiently informed of the latest research on human perceptual and cognitive response to the arts.  Much research indicates that we know too little about the relationship between nature and nurture.  Studies indicate that there may be cross-cultural similarities in our response to facial characteristics and humor because of hard wiring.  The ambience of this kind of up to date knowledge does have an effect on our thinking about reality and values.  For example, an earth centered belief led philosophers and others to think differently about substantive matters than after the Copernican universe was firmly established.  I believe that philosophy can still function as philosophy—the search for meaning and values in what seems to be a chaotic existence—with greater scientific knowledge of how human beings function.

            A third area of concern is that Graham’s book represents only part of the world, a questionable practice in the twenty-first century unless the title specifically states the limitation.  His title should really be A Western Philosophy of the Arts.  The title appears to be all encompassing, and in that, he fails to acknowledge that the Western world can learn a great deal about artistic quality from the African and Asian worlds.  While we are one species, each culture interprets reality through differing perspectives, and hence, their arts reflect that dimension.  To ignore contributions of major civilizations to aesthetic ideation is to lessen the understanding of why the human community makes art.  To be sure, there is much in those worlds that make function a major component in many of their artistic products.  Moreover, there is seldom written discussion available.  Japanese Shinto Shrines, for example, contain much dictated by Shinto beliefs.  Nevertheless, they do contain fundamental principles also of qualities that we can call beautiful.  Function in itself is not an impediment to an object containing beautifying elements as part of its construction.  The West also combines function with artistic qualities.  One of the most obvious examples is automobile design.  One may quibble with the ideal of beauty of the design element of such but cannot argue against the attempt to make the object one of artistic appeal.  In fact, that is much of what drives that industry in conjunction with other elements.  The West tends to separate its art from the everyday world, ensconce it in museums set aside for the purpose, but this does not make a philosophy of the arts immune from taking into consideration the full range of human expression.

            Coming from an educational perspective, there is much to admire in Graham’s book, not the least of which is his scholarship.  Coming from a creative point of view, philosophy, if it is to engender understanding of meaning and value, must take into consideration the full range of human ideation and action.