Consciousness, Literature and the Arts

Archive

Volume 6 Number 3, December 2005

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Kieran, Matthew, Revealing Art, London and New York, Routledge, 2005, 280 p., 0-415-27853-8 (hbk), £45.00, 0-415-27853-6 (pbc), £13.99.

Reviewed by

Christian W. Denker

University Paris-1

 Instead of taking art as an illustration for our thoughts, Kieran takes it as an inspiring challenge for theory. The reflection on values such as originality, beauty and truth leads him to considerations on the relation between art, morality. and humanism. Though he focuses on contemporary art, his presentation includes a wide range of works from various periods; Renaissance, Baroque, Romanticism, Impressionism, Expressionism and the early 20s century. One of Kieran's main objectives is to explain why art is neither an 'inanimate mannequin of fashion' (p. 234) nor 'best seen as a further playing out of anti-traditional concerns' (p. 255). While writing about the act of distinguishing 'good or great art works from the mediocre or downright bad' (p.4) Kieran questions our motive to become engaged with art. He goes on to ask, 'Why play soccer?' (p. 225) and he proposes a variety of possible answers: 'we just do', 'we have a love of pattern etc. which serves us well in other spheres', 'we find this valuing pays off in other ways', 'the system of valuing enables us to get on intersubjectively in various ways' (p. 225).

The description of Auguste Rodin's The Kiss in Kieran's introduction already shows us how difficult it is to draw a clear line of separation between the erotic and the pornographic. Kieran takes the position of defending artistic autonomy against moralistic claims. According to him, obscene or immoral artistic works are a matter of individual responsibility and of no concern to lawmakers in a liberal state. 'To condemn pornographic pictures as necessarily bad art or unappreciable as art is nothing short of puritanical wishful thinking' (p. 165). In spite of this he agrees that we should not be readily exposed to 'highly explicit sexual images' against our will. According to Kieran the pornographic as 'a sub-species of the erotic', that uses distinctive means: 'sexually explicit representation' (p. 152). But is pornography is always erotic? One might argue that the explicit representation of sexuality can be erotic as well as pornographic. Moreover, can pornography be reduced to a certain type of representation without reference to the attitude of the consumer? This is certainly a matter for debate. Kieran argues in the tradition of Hume and his difficulty with offering definite criteria to differentiate art and pornography results from the general problem that subjectivity poses to aesthetic judgement. According to Hume, different humors of particular persons contradict the establishment of objective taste: 'Our affections, desires and aspirations [...] have an influence on the kind of things we come to like and appreciate' (p. 212). So does it depend on our personal attitude whether we consider Rodin's Naked Woman Reclining with Legs Apart to be erotic, artistic, or pornographic? Kieran tries to show that this is not the case, or at least not always. For example he asserts that representing, looking at, or considering others in terms of sexual desires is necessarily morally problematic, if there is a link 'to contempt, disdain or a failure to respect female autonomy' (p. 165). This might be so, but it hardly provides us with 'formulaic elements of pornography' (p.156).

With good reason Kieran rejects the idea of one standard of taste against which all our responses to art can theoretically be measured (p.229). Nevertheless, he insists on a hierarchy of undeveloped, refined, coarse, or indiscriminate tastes (p. 213). Therefore he proposes that we develop aesthetic skills by 'looking at different art works, listening to those whose appreciation is more refined than our own or reading good art critics' (p. 215). This concession to an institutionalized regulation of taste becomes necessary if we reject experience as the measure of aesthetic quality. In this context Kieran argues that the 'pleasures afforded by coffee drinking' are related to the 'nature of the objects or activities involved' (p. 22). Indeed, well roasted coffee beans, fresh spring water, vigilant preparation, an attentive waiter, and some gentile sunshine help to make a decent cup of café. But what if the coffee tastes bad in spite of all its "objective" qualities? Prior recognition of artistic achievements, the temporal and spatial context of the production and presentation, the social and historical implications etc., are significant for the value of art. Nonetheless, art needs to be experienced. The suggestion that artistic achievement is possible before anyone experienced it (p. 29) is debatable. It is founded on the possibility of a definitive distinction between artist and spectator. Even if this possibility can't be denied, it creates difficulties for the evaluation of major works of contemporary art (for exemple Jochen Gerz, Antonio Muntadas, Jeffrey Shaw) which imply the participation of both.

Kieran's book is bound to provoke controversial discussions on many fronts. In fact, Kieran has written such a courageous, engaged and detailed plea in favor of artistic freedom that it should help to loosen bogged down attitudes towards art and theory among the general public and aestheticians alike.